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Competition Policy in a Small Open Economy
Hajime Sugeta
This paper carries out the comparative statics in a two-sector
general equilibrium model of Cournot oligopoly in the short-run
and long-run equilibria. The production structure of the economy
is allowed to exhibits non-homotheticity of the production func
tions. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare-
improving competition policy of a small open economy. It will be
shown that the industry must be initially sufficiently concentrated
for the competition policy to be welfare-improving in the long-run
equilibrium. This result disproves the general validity of the com
mon excess entry theorem: a marginal reduction of the number of
firms from the long-run free-entry level is always beneficial to the
economy.
1  Introduction
The neoclassical trade literature has relied heavily on the assumptions of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Models with these
assumptions have been extensively analyzed in the literature.'' Models with
variable returns to scale have also been introduced in the literature.^ To
avoid incompatibility between perfect competition and increasing returns
to scale, it has been commonly assumed that the returns to scale are exter
nal to the firm but internal to the industry.
Models of the new theory of trade have been introduced by Krugman
(1979, 1980), Brander (1981), and Brander and Krugman (1983). They as
sume imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale that are inter
nal to the firms. The phenomenon of intra-industry trade that cannot be
explained in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model can now be explained
by those models. Trade models with monopolistic competition have sub
sequently been analyzed in the general equilibrium framework.^ These
1  See, e.g., Jones (1965), Ethier (1974), and Chang (1979).
2  See, e.g., Jones (1968), Mayer (1974), Chang (1981), Herberg, Kemp, and Tawada (1982), and
Ishikawa (1994). These contributions are systematically summarized in Wong (1995).
3  See, e.g., Dixit and Norman (1980), Helpman (1981), Das (1982), Horn (1983), Ohyama (1997), and
Suzuki (1997).
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models, however, did not address the issue of competition or merger
policy because the strategic interactions among the firms are assumed
away.
Recently, there are new studies on the role of competition policy in an
open economy with oligopolistic competition in a general equilibrium
framework.^ By allowing U-shaped average cost curves, Ohyama (1993,
1999) showed that many standard trade theorems carry over to a general
equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition. He showed that under the
assumptions of decreasing costs, an antitrust policy applied to a country's
export industry worsens its terms of trade and may cause a welfare loss,
whereas an antitrust policy applied to a country's import-competing indus
try improves its terms of trade and potential welfare. In a related study,
Francois and Horn (1998) discussed the strategic competition policy in a
two-country general equilibrium model with constant-return-to-scale tech
nologies. They showed that in a Nash equilibrium in the competition policy
game, an importing country chooses perfect competition in its import-
competing industry and the exporting country chooses some degree of
cartelization in its export industry. They also showed that the non-coop
erative competition policy is globally inefficient. However, these studies
assumed that each government's control variable is its firms' common
markup rate, but not its number of firms.
In this paper, we analyze comparative statics in the short-run and long-
run equilibria of a small open economy with Cournot oligopolistic sectors.
We assume that the production technologies are non-homothetic. Since
the number of firms or the market structure plays a significant role in an
imperfectly competitive economy, it is important to examine how a change
in the number of firms affects outputs, factor rewards, and national wel
fare. It is also important to examine the effects of free entry on the long-
run equilibrium. We shall also examine the implications of competition
policy for national welfare. Konishi, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Suzumura (1990)
showed that in a general equilibrium model of a closed economy, it is
beneficial to reduce the number of firms from the level at the free-entry
Cournot equilibrium (the excess entry theorem).® This is because the exces-
4  The relevant literature in the partial equilibrium framework is Barros and Cabral (1994), Horn and
Levinsohn (2001), and Collie (2003).
5  To derive this theorem, they assumed that the consumer's preferences are represented by a quasi-
linear utility function. Ohyama (1999) also proved a version of this theorem by interpreting an
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sive entry reduces a firm's output and raises the average cost that is equal
to price in the long-run equilibrium.® The present paper provides a neces
sary and sufficient condition for this theorem to hold in a small open econ
omy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general equilib
rium model of an economy with two oligopolistic sectors and two factors
of production. Section 3 introduces the concepts of non-homotheticity in
production and average and marginal factor intensities. Sections 4 analyzes
comparative statics in the short-run equilibrium. Section 6 analyzes the wel
fare effect of competition policies both in the short-run and long-run equi
libria. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 The Environment
Consider an economy consisting of two sectors, 1 and 2. In sector i{i = 1,2),
there are ru Cournot firms producing the homogeneous good i from two
primary factors, labor and capital. These firms are assumed to behave
competitively in the factor markets. The endowments of labor and capital in
the economy are predetermined by L and K, respectively. The production
technology in sector i exhibits variable returns to scale at the firm level and
is characterized by a common total cost function, C\w,r,Xi), where Xi
denotes the output of an individual firm in sector i and w and r are the
wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respectively. Let pi be the price of
commodity i and Y the national income. Preferences are assumed to be
homothetic. Then the total demand for product i is expressed as A=ACPi,
pi\Y. Taking the price of the other sector's good and the national
income as given and also taking its rivals' outputs as given, a representa
tive firm in sector i maximizes its own profit with respect to its output. This
ensures that the perceived marginal revenue equals marginal cost; that is.
Pi (l-mjriii) = a where mt is the market share of the representative firm
in sector i, r]u= -(pi/Di)dDi/dpi>0 is the price elasticity of demand for
Increase in a firm's markup as a reduction of the number of firms. The excess entry theorem was
studied earlier by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) in a partial equi
librium framework.
6  In a partial equilibrium model, a similar argument is found in Horstmann and Markusen (1986).
They showed that import tariffs and export subsidies lead to inefficient entry that raises the average
cost of production.
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product i, and Cl = d&/dxi is the marginal cost of the representative firm in
sector i? The homothetic preferences implies that rju is a function of prices
alone.^ The firm's demands for labor and capital can be obtained by apply
ing Shephard's Lemma to the total cost function and therefore the input-
output coefficients in sector i are given by aLi = Cw/xi and aKi = Cr/xi.
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions
In a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, mi = l/ni must hold. Thus the
first-order conditions in equilibrium can be expressed as:
PiYi = cUw,r,xi), P2r2 = Cl(w,r,X2), (1)
where the degree of competition is defined as
0<yi = l ^^<1, with p = —, i = l,2.
UiPiiip) Pj
In a closed economy, the goods market-clearing conditions are
Di{pi,p2)Y^Xi=niXi, D2(PhP2)Y=X2 = n2X2, (2)
where the national income identity is defined as
Y=^ PiXi =wL + rK+Y, ni[piXi - CHw,r,Xi)]. (3)
i=l,2 1=1.2
The full-employment conditions are
an(w,r,xi)Xi + aL2(w,r,X2)X2 = L, (4)
aKi(w,r,xi)Xi -I- aK2(w,r,X2)X2 = K. (5)
The above conditions in (1)-(5) are for the short-run equilibrium in a sense
7  Throughout the analyses, the subscript of the cost function denotes the partial derivative with
respect to that variable; for example, Ci = dC^/dw and Ciy = d^C^/dwdyi.
8  lUsing the homogeneity of the demand function, we have Di=Di{'p,\)Y/pj where Thus the
price-elasticity becomes
jO dPiip.W/Pi _ V dDi(p,\)_
Di(p.l)Y/Vj dpi A(P,1) dpi
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that the numbers of firms in both sectors are fixed. In the long run, free
entry and exit result in zero profits in each sector. Thus the zero-profit con
ditions must be added to characterize the long-run equilibrium:
PiXi^C\w,r,xi), p2X2 = C^{w,r,X2). (6)
Since Cx{w,r,Xi) is homogeneous of degree one in w and r, Di(pi,p2,Y)
is homogeneous of degree zero in pi, p2 and Y, and aji(j=K,L-, i = 1,2) is
homogeneous of degree zero in w and r, the above system can only be
solved for relative prices. By Walras' law, one of the equations in (2), (4),
and (5) is redundant. Instead of dropping one of these equations, we
rewrite (2) as
Di(PhP2) ^ Xl= ^ 1^1 (2')
D2(PhP2) X2 712X2 '
Thus in the short run, given the exogenous variables ni, 712, K and L,
the six equations in (1), (2'), (3), (4) and (5) determine the six endogenous
variables, pi/p2, w/p2, r/p2, x\, X2 and 7/p2. In the long run, 7i\ and 712
become the endogenous variables and the two equations in (6) added to
solve the long-run equilibrium.
3  Preliminaries to Comparative Statics
To perform the comparative-statics analysis, we shall first make some
assumptions on factor intensities and introduce the elasticity terms describ
ing the degrees of scale economies and the biasedness of non-homothetic-
ity in production.
3.1 Elasticities
We assume that the production technologies in both sectors exhibit vari
able returns to scale. The degree of scale economies in sector i is defined
as the ratio of MC to AC in that sector:
_ XiCl(,w,r,Xi)
C\w,r,Xi)
<
>
Sector i exhibits
IRS
CRS
DRS
Following Horn (1983), we define the output elasticities of the demand for
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labor and capital in sector i as
i ^  d\nCUw,r,Xi) ^  XiCwx(w,r,Xi)
dlnxi Cw(w,r,Xi)
i_ d\n.Cr{w,r,Xi) ^ XiCrx{w,r,Xi)
d]nXi Cr (w,r,Xi)
Assume that the factor demands are increasing with respect to output,
which ensures ^ 1^0 and Denote the labor and capital shares in
sector i by
^ _ wCw(w,r,Xi) ^ _ rCr {w,r,Xi)
C\w,r,Xi) ' C^(w,r,Xi)
where On + Om = 1- Then the degree of scale economies is expressed as
fJ-i = HlOu + MkOki-
If the production function is homothetic, iUi = ^L = ink- In general, jui + jul
and fii + ^ik. Furthermore, we obtain
d]n6Li ,.i .. dXwOKi _ .j
These two elasticities measure the non-homothetic bias in sector i. If ^ 1-
jUi>0, the non-homothetic bias is called labor-using, and if ink-Mi>^' the
non-homothetic bias is called capital-using (Horn (1983)).
Define the output elasticity of marginal cost in sector i as
_ dlnCUw,r,Xi) ^  XiC^x{w,r,Xi) ^q
d\n.Xi Cx(w,r,Xi) <
If the marginal cost curve slopes upward (downward), then xj/i is positive
(negative). Thus the output elasticity of the degree of scale economies is
=  = \ + xi/i-^i,
dmXi
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which is assumed to be positive.®
Since the input price elasticities of the factor demands in sector i are
given by
^Cn)w Ck ^ vOrr Ci
- - OKiCi, - -d\n.w Cw ^Inr Cr
where the elasticity of input substitution is
dUd/Ci)
dMw/r) del '
the changes in the input-output coefficients in sector i can be expressed as
dLi= — 0Ki<yi{w — f) + (/11—l)Xi, (7)
dKi=9Li<7i(w — f) + (jJ.K—l)Xi. (8)
If the production technologies in both sectors are CRS, fii = iil = ^ik= 1 and
a change in the output has no effect on the input-output coefficients.
Next, we examine the elasticities on the demand side. Due to homo
geneity of the demand functions, we have
-% + %•+1 = 0, ii=j = 1,2, (9)
where the price and income elasticities of the demand for commodity i are
defined as
riii= -^^>0 and r]ij=^^>0, i^j.
Di dpi Di dpj
3.2 Factor Intensity Conditions
We have defined dji as factory's cost share in sector i. Let Xji denote the
fraction of factory employed in sector i(j-K,L-, 1,2). Let 6 and X be
9  Helpman (1981) and Horn (1983) also assumed >0.
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On Oki wClu/& rCl/&'
Ol2 0k2. _wC\/& rcVc^y
Xn Xl2 niCfjL
.Xki Xk2. niCl/K n2Cl/K_
e=
x=
Similarly, let 6' and A' be
& =
A' =
O'n O'la On
Note that & and X are not stochastic matrices although Q and X are. How
ever,
/A Oki/A
.e'L2 Oia. .Ol2/A Ok2/Ik .'
Ail Xl2 XlijA Xl2/A
.Xia X'ks,. .XkijA Xk2/A.
&' =
&L &kx
O" iQ"
C7L2 ^K2
IJ'lOLlfA
/X2OL2ML lXtdK2MK.
is a stochastic matrix and \0"\ = |^'|-
Suppose that sector 1 is more labor-intensive than sector 2. Then we
can sign the determinants of the above matrices:
cV
>0 (11a)
cl
,
\X\ = XlI — Xl2 — Xk2 — Xki — ninzCjCt I C
LK
I ^ A
^2 r-i ' ' (lib)
Suppose also that sector 1 is marginally more labor-intensive than sector 2.
Then
I A' I = Xl\X'k2 — X'L2Xk\ —
\d' 1 - OiiOki — =
.  X1X2CLCL (^ rx
LK \^wx cLJ
wrxix^lxCwx( ^21 ^ rx ^ rx
I\ ^ wx ^wx
>0,
> 0.
(12a)
(12b)
Furthermore, we assume that the average capital intensity in sector 2 is
greater than the marginal capital intensity in sector 1:
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lAil-
Ail Al2
Aifi Xk2
Xm^Lci (cl cL
LK
>0,
^wx
(13a)
and that the marginal capital intensity in sector 2 is greater than the aver
age capital intensity in sector 1:
IA2I =
Aifl X'k2
niX2PicL ( CL Cl
LK \CL Cl >0. (13b)
Note that the difference of /nl and /A is positively related with the differ
ence between the average and marginal factor intensities:
,,i ,,i— ^ iCwx
flL-flK-
ci
^rx
^wx
The difference between the factor intensity conditions is
I A' I — I A'il = Ai,iAiif2/^i iylJ-k ~ AKiAL2/rk^jui -1 j, i +j = 1,2.
If then we have |A'|-|A'i|>0. If then we have
|A'| - |A'i|< 0. In the case of homothetic production functions,
and
\X'\-\X'i\= i *j=l,2.
If the production functions exhibit IRS (/Zi<l), then both |A'|-|Ai| and
I A'I - IA2I are negative. In the case of the CRS production functions, we have
lA=liil = ILii^l and I A' | = | Ajl = | A| (j + i = 1,2).
4 Comparative Statics for a Cournot Oiigopoiy in the Short-Run Equi
librium
Consider a small open economy with commodity prices, pi and p2, fixed at
the world levels. For this small open economy in the short-run equilibrium,
we have the five equations in (1), (3), (4), and (5) to determine the five
endogenous variables, w, r, xi, X2, and Y given the exogenous variables, pi,
P2, nu n2, K and L.
We consider the case where only market structures change. Logarith
mic differentiation of (1) gives
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fi = ffiiW + + y/iXi, i=l,2, (14)
where a "hat" over a variable represents the proportional change in that
variable; for example, v =dv/v. From the definition of yi, it follows that
fi = (ntriii (nirju -1)'%.
Differentiating the full-employment conditions gives
^L\X\ + ^12X2 = - (Aiidii -I- AL2dz,2),
^KiXl + XK2X2 - - {XkxAkI + Xk2&K2!I-
Substituting (7) and (8) yields
Xl\X\-\- ^ 12X2 = — — Xl\(iA~X)X\- Xl2{iA — X)X2,
XkxXx + Xk2X2= ~ — Xk\{IJ^K~ 1)^1 ~ Xk2{/^~ 1)^2-
where
Sl = Aiiftficr 1 + Xi26K2<y2 3nd 5k=XkiOlxO 1 -1- Ajf 2^x,20'2.
\Js\y\QXi = ni+Xi{i=\,2), we have
Xl\X\ + Xl2X2-6L(w-r)= -XnUi - A/,2W2, (15a)
X'k\X\ + Aif 2^2 + SK{w — r)= — Xki^i — Xk2'5>2- (15b)
Regarding 71 and 72 as exogenous variables, the system is given by the
matrix equation:
0 d" d"tfll "ki X\
0 ¥2 &l2 &K2 £2
X'li X'l2 -5l 5l w
X'k\ X'k2
1
r
n
72
— AilWl — ^12^2
— XkYTIx — XK2'fi2
(16)
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We consider three cases: (1) the short-run equilibrium where the numbers
of firms are exogenously fixed; (3) the long-run equilibrium where the
numbers of firms are endogenously debermined by free entry. We also
maintain the assumption that sector 1 is more labor-intensive than sector 2
in both average and marginal sense.
Let J denote the coefficient matrix in (16). Its determinant can be written
as
|t/| = y/'lA2 -I- + \0"
where
Af = Sx^Li + SiAxi >0, i = 1,2,
and lJ|>0 by a stability condition shown in the Appendix.
Solving (16), we obtain
= -j^A2(7i ~ 5^2)- [v^2Ai -I- \d"\ |A2|]ni
-  W2l!^2+\d"\^L2^K2(t&-l^l)]U2, (17a)
-  W\l^2+\d"\ |Ai|]W2 (17b)
where
Ai = Sx^Li + SiXxi >0, i = 1,2.
From Xi = ni+Xi, it follows that the changes in industry outputs are:
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+  [V1A2 + V'2(Ai - Ai) + \6"\ (|A'| - |A2|)]wi
-  [y^2^2+\0"\XL2^K2(^&:-I^L)\n2, (18a)
X2=-^A'i(fi-f2)
-  [ViAi ~ |0"| Az,iAiri(/xir-yui)]')^i
+  [Vi(A2- A2) + V^2Ai + \ff'\ (|A'| - |Ai|)]«2- (18b)
The changes in the factor rewards are:
w = (^2Ai + 0;ff2|'^''|) fi + (V1A2 - 0ih|A'l) 72
+  [Vi(V2Ai + 0^21-^1) + y^2dmXLiXKi(MK~
+  [V^2(ViA2- ^^nlA'l) + y/lOK2XL2XK2 (j^lr —/^i)]W2,
r= (^2Ai - 0£'2|'^1) fi + (V1A2 + ^li|A'|) 72
+  [Vi {W2^i ~ 0i-2|>^'|) - W2^iXliXki(/rlr-/ui)]wi
+  [y^2 (V^iA2 + 0Li|A'|) — y^l0L2XL2XK2(MK~/jl)\'^2-
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Thus the change in the wage-rental ratio is:
.  . |A'|w-r=^{Yi-Y2)
-j^ [y/'^X.'^ — y/iXL2^K2(li%~l^^i^'n'2- (20)
Next we examine the case where the degree of competition is related
to the number of firms. The change in the degree of competition is given
by fi = (ni77ii -1)"' (ni+f7n). Recall that the r^'s are functions of income and
prices in the case of general preferences. Thus fju can theoretically be
expressed in terms of Pi and Y. If preferences are homothetic, then rju
depends only on the relative price, Pi/pj{i 4= j = 1,2). In the case of a small
open economy where the commodity prices are exogenously given, %
becomes constant and, therefore,
Yi = = (niT]u -!)-!> 0.
In this case, the change in the degree of competition is proportional to the
change in the number of firms. Therefore the above comparative-static
results are modified as
^1 = [^1^2 - ¥2^1 - l^'l IA2I] Wl
—  [^2A2-i-V^2A2 +1 1^1,2^X2 (21a)
£2 = - [^lA'i -I- ^ lAi — \d"\ XLi^ia{p]c-
+  [^2Ai — V''iA2 - \d"\ IAi|]fi2, (21 b)
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and
[(li + ¥1)^2 + !/^2(Ai - Ai) + \e"\ (|A'| - |A^|)]ni
-  [^2/^2-^ Y2^2+\d"\XL2^K2(l^K- (22a)
-^2- - [^lA'i + ^lAi — \d"\XLiXKi{n](-n])]ni
+  [(^2 + V^2) Ai + Vi(A2 - A2) + \6"\ (|A'| - |Ai|)]n2. (22b)
On the other hand, the changes in the factor rewards are;
w =
J_
ki
^i(vr2Al + 0^2|A'|) + yfiiy/^Ai + 0X2IA2I)
+ v^2^mALiAjfi(//i'—//i) ni
+
X
kl
^2( V1A2 — A'|) + v^2( V1A2 — A'D
+ ^ldK2^L2^K2{l^K- n2, (23a)
r =
ki
^i(Vr2Ai — 0l2|A'|) + Vi(v^2A1 — 0l2|A'|)
~ W2dLl^Ll^K\{lJ']c- IJd) ni
+
ki
i^2(V''iA2 + ^'i|A'|) + V^2(ViA2 + ^Li|A'|)
~ Yi^L2^L2^K2{MK — Mh 712. (23b)
Therefore the change in the wage-rental ratio is:
w-r= [1^11A'l + + V"2Ai,iAjfi(//i:—/^i)]fii
X
ki
[^2|A'| -I- ^ 2!All -II7i^L2^K2{Mk~Ml) 1^2 (24)
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4.1 The Effects of a Change in the Market Structure
If the degree of competition, yu is linked with the number of firms, nu then
the results will be modified as follows:
- -j-^ [i^2A2 + V^2A2+ |0"1 AL2Aji:2(j"i-jWi)]W2, l''l(25a)
X2 = - -j^ [i^iA'i + ViAi - \d"\ XliXk\ l'='l
+ -^[^2Ai-v^iA2-lr| \X[\]n2, W\(25b)
^ [(^1 + v^i) A'2 + v^2(Ai - Ai) + \e"\ (\X'\ - ix^ni
- -j^ [^2A2+ V^2A2+ |0"|AL2A^r2(/^l:~/'i)]fi2, w\(26a)
X2= - -j^ [^lA'i + v^iAi - \0"\XliXki(^k-/iiL)]ni W\
+ ^ [(^2+ V^2)Ai + v^i(A'2- A2) + \e"\ {\X'\ - \X[\)]n2.
Thus
-A /\ I+ \ffi) (Ai + A^ + ( va2 - V'l) (Ai - Ai)
+ \6"\ ([A'l - IA2I - XliXkAij^k-tjh)
ni
J_
ki
(^2 + W2) (Ai + A2) + (Wi- ¥2) (A2 - A2)
+ \d"\ (|A'| - |A1| + XL2XK2(lJ^K — fll))
W2.
(26b)
(27)
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Proposition 1 In a short-run equilibrium of a small open economy with
Cournot oligopolistic sectors, an increase in the number of firms in sector i
reduces a firm's output in that sector if and only if
+  i=\,2. i+i; (28a)
it increases the sector's output if and only if
+  + + i=l,2. j*v, (28b)
it raises the relative industry output of that sector if and only if
+ Wi) (^i + ^2) + (VO' ~ Wi) ~ ^i)
+ \9"\i\X'\-\X'j\ —XiiXKiipk- i=l,2. j+i. (28c)
In the present case, the change in the wage-rental ratio is
w-r= -jjj- [^i|A'| + xi/i\X^ + p])]n\
~ "Pj" - Yi^L2^K2{lA—I^l)]'fi2- (29)
Proposition 2 In a short-run equilibrium of a small open economy with
Cournot oligopolistic sectors, an increase in the number of firms in sector
1, whose production is more labor-intensive, raises the wage-rental ratio if
and only if
^i|A'| + xi/i\X^> y/2^Li^Ki{pL-pk)- (30a)
On the other hand, an increase in the number of firms in sector 2, whose
production is relatively capital intensive, lowers the wage-rental ratio if and
only if
^2|A'| + V^2|Ai|> \yiXL2^K2{plk- p\). (30b)
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If the technologies are homothetic and the marginal costs are non-
decreasing, then the above proposition always holds without any restric
tions other than the factor intensity conditions. The slopes of the marginal
costs and the parameters indicating the non-homothetic bias also play
important roles in determining the effects of a change in the market struc
ture.
5 Welfare Analysis of a Competition Policy
5.1 Welfare Analysis of a Short-Run Competition Policy
In order to evaluate the effects of a competition policy in the short-run equi
librium, we first define the welfare measurement. To facilitate the analysis,
we assume that preferences are homothetic. Then the price elasticity of
demand, riu, depends only on commodity prices. Because of our small
country setting, riu becomes constant.
The welfare of the economy is measured by the social indirect utility
function:
V^Vip,,p2,Y).
Total differentiation gives
-^dV=-Didpi-D2flp2+dY, (31)
Vy
where use is made of Roy's identity and Vy= dV/dY is the marginal utility
of income.
Totally differentiating Y-piXi +P2X2 gives
dY=^(Xidpi +PidXi).
1=1,2
Substituting this for dFin (31) and using the balance-of-payment condition.
Pi {Di-Xi) = -p2 {D2-X2), we obtain
-.y. V= -Sm.(Pl —P2) +S1X1 +S2X2 (32)
I Vy
where Sm is the share of imports defined by Sm =pi (A-Xi)/Y.
In the small open economy, the commodity prices are fixed, that is.
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P\ =P2 = 0. Thus the welfare change becomes
V
YVy
Using (26), we obtain
F— SiXi + S2X2 (32')
F - 1
-F= A
YVy |J|
Si ((^1 + y/i)A2 + - Ai)) - S2 (^2Ai + V^lAi)
+ \e"\ (si(|A'| - \X^\) -S2XKiXniPK-fih) ni
S2((^2 + ^^2) Ai + V''i(A'2 — A2)) — Si(i^iA2 + V2A2)
+ \d"\ (S2(|A'| — \X\\)-S\Xl2Xk2{1&- 712.(33)
In the special case of CRS technologies, we have \ifi=Q, pic= \X'\ =
\X'i\, and A'i = Ai (i==l,2).
Therefore
^ F= -j^ (si(^iA2 - S2^2Ai){n\ -^2)■ (33')FFk |J|
Hence we establish
Proposition 3 In a small open economy with Cournot oligopolistic sectors
and CRS technologies, if country's competition policy is more stringent
towards sector i than sector j in the sense of promoting an increase in
njuj, such a policy is beneficiai to the country if and only if
i,j= 1,2. j+i.
Ai Aj
(34)
Since becomes larger as ni becomes smaller, the opti
mal competition policy should be more stringent towards a more concen
trated industry, an industry with a higher share of production value in the
national income, and/or an industry with a smaller factor employment
share.
As another special case, suppose that sector j + t is perfectly competi
tive and has a CRS technology. Then we have ^j = vo = 0, pic=pi = l,
\X' I = \X'j\ and Aj = Aj, and therefore the effect on the welfare of a competi
tion policy towards sector i is
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rvy |J|
It follows that:
Proposition 4 Suppose that sector i is a Cournot oligopolistic sector with
a general production structure and sector j is a competitive sector with CRS
technology. A competition policy that raises Ui will increase the national
welfare if and only if
Sii^i + y/i)Aj>Sj(y/iAi + \0"\XKihi(MK-pL)). 05)
The above condition is likely to hold (a) if the initial number of firms is
sufficiently small, (b) if the marginal cost is decreasing (y/i<0), or (c) if the
non-homothetic bias is toward the factor that is intensively used in sector i
{pi>pid-
5.2 Excess Entry Theorem in a Small Open Economy
Next we examine the validity of excess entry theorem in a small open
economy. To do so, we assume that the economy is initially in a long-run
equilibrium.
Totally differentiating the national income identity (3), we obtain
dY=lL-^niCi]dw + lK-^niCUdr
\  1=1,2 / \ i=l,2 /
+ X Xidpi + ^ni{pi -Cl)dXi,
i=1.2 i=l,2
where use is made of the zero-profit conditions (6). Using the full-employ
ment conditions, (4) and (5), and the first-order condition, (1), we have
dF = X Xidpi + X -Cfl)dXi.
i=\.2 i=l,2
Using this and the balance-of-payment condition, pi(A -^i) = -p2(D2-X2),
in (31), we obtain
-^dV= -piiDi -Xi)(pi -p2) + X PiXid - rdA (36)
i=l,2
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In a small open economy, the commodity prices are fixed, that is, p\ =P2 = 0.
Thus the welfare change becomes
-^dV=J^PiXi(l-ri)Xi. (36')
i=l2
To examine the effects of a competition policy on the welfare, we as
sume that sector 2 is perfectly competitive (y2= l>7i) and the correspond
ing technology is characterized by CRS (//2 = /rl= iil= !)• Then in a long-run
free-entry equilibrium the welfare-improving competition policy towards
the oligopolistic sector must expand its firms' outputs.
To consider an increase in the number of firms from the free-entry
equilibrium, we need to use the comparative-statics result of a short-run
equilibrium because the number of firms are under control of the govern
ment. From (25a), we have
where = (wiT/u -1)"^ is fixed under the homothetic preferences. Therefore
an increase in the number of firms in sector 1 leads to an increase in x\ if
and only if
^iA2-|0"||A|>O
If the degree of competition is independent of the number of firms, the
first-term in the above expression must vanish. Since the sign of \ff'\ is the
same as |A|, we establish
Proposition 5 In a small open economy, if the degree of competition is
independent of the number of firms in the oligopolistic sector, a marginal
increase in the number of firms from the free-entry equilibrium level unam
biguously worsens the welfare of the economy. On the other hand, if the
degree of competition is related to the number of firms in the oligopolistic
sector and if preferences are homothetic, then a marginal increase in the
number of firms from the free-entry equilibrium level improves the welfare
of the economy if the number of the oligopolistic firms in the long-run
equilibrium is sufficiently small such that
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1<W1<—(T-TTTr + lV (37)7711V 1^11 A| j
According to the excess entry theorem established by Konishi, Okuno-
Fujiwara, and Suzumura (1990) for a closed economy, a marginal reduction
in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free-entry equilibrium level
unambiguously improves the welfare. This is because excess entry makes
a firm's output small, thereby raising the average cost and the commodity
price. Since there are unexploited increasing returns, entry restrictions
expand the output and lowers the commodity price. In our model, the price
levels are fixed and the firms' outputs might not be small if the long-run
number of firms is small. An increase in the number of firms raises the
input demands and their factor rewards. This leads to an increase in
national income and therefore an increase in the demand for the commod
ity produced by the oligopolists. Hence the firms' outputs will expand if the
long-run number of firms is sufficiently small. If the utility function is quasi-
linear as assumed in Konishi et al. (1990), this income effect cannot appear
and the excess entry theorem becomes valid.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have derived a number of comparative-statics results in
the general equilibrium model of Cournot oligopoly. We have also evalu
ated the welfare effect of the competition policy of a small open economy.
Unlike the traditional analysis, the market structure in the present model
can affect the short-run equilibrium and it becomes endogenously deter
mined as a result of free entry in the long-run equilibrium. Finally, this
paper provided a necessary and sufficient condition for a competition pol
icy of a small open economy to be welfare-improving in the short-run and
long-run equilibria. In general, for a competition policy to be effective, the
industry initially must be sufficiently concentrated. This result disproves the
general validity of the common excess entry theorem: a marginal reduction
of the number of firms from the long-run free-entry level is always benefi
cial to the economy.
Some extensions may be considered. It is well-known that free trade is
optimal for a small country. However, because of the market imperfection.
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there may exist an optimal tariff in our model of a small open economy. It
is also interesting to examine the interaction between the competition and
trade policies. Our analyses rely strongly on the assumption of the small
country. It is natural to extend the present model by removing this assump
tion. In this case, the composition of the numbers of firms can be a deter
minant of the pattern of trade in the short-run equilibrium. One can also
discuss the gains from trade. In the short-run equilibrium, profits may not
be zero in the oligopolistic sectors and, therefore, free trade may harm one
of the countries because of the increased competition. In our analysis of
the competition policy, it is not strategic because of the absence of foreign
competition policy. The extension to the two-country model allows us to
examine a competition-policy game. This will generalize Francois and Horn
(1999) to the case with a more general production structure. Our two-sec
tor, two-factor general equilibrium model is a static one, but it can be
extended to a dynamic general equilibrium framework by assuming one
sector produces the investment goods and the other the consumption
goods. It should be worthwhile to examine whether a country with a higher
saving rate has more firms in the consumption goods sector or in the
investment goods sector in a steady state. These extensions are, however,
left for future research.
(Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics)
Appendix: Stability Analysis
The Stability of the Short-Run Equilibrium
Following Mayer (1974) and Chang (1981), we propose the following
adjustment process:
xi = di[piYi-C]c(w,r,x^],
xz = dzlpzYi - Cl{w,r,X2i],
w = d3[Ci,(w,r,xi)ni + Cw{w,r,X2)n2- L],
r = di[C\(w,r,X])n\ + Cr(w,r,X2)n2 - K],
where the speeds of adjustment, d/s, are assumed to be positive constant.
The Jacobian on the above system is given by
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J =
-diy/id/xi
0
d^LX'ii/xi
diKX'K\Xx\
0
-d2y/2d/x2
dsLXL2/X2
dtiKX'Ko/^2
-dMiCl/w
-d29hCl/w
- dzLSi/w
diKSx/w
- diOxiCx/r
-d29K2Cx/r
dzLdi/r
-diKdR/r
and its determinant is
1^1 dxdzdzd^LKXxGx^x j^|
wrxiXzXz
where
I J| - ^2Ai + V''iA2+ |0"||A'|.
Thus stability requires
|J|>0 |J|>0.
The Stability of the Long-Run Equilibrium
We propose the following adjustment process:
ni = di[pia;i - d{w,r,x\)],
n2 = d2[p2X2-d{w,r,X2^],
w = dz[Cw{w,r,x\)n\ + Cw(w,r,X'^n2- L],
r - di[C]-(w,r,x\)n\-\-Cr(w,r,x^n2-K\,
where Xi=Xi (w,r,ni) is the equilibrium output. Therefore the Jacobian
matrix becomes
H =
-didQii/w -didQKi/r did{l- jui)ai/ni 0
-d2d@L2/w -d2d©K2/r 0 d2C^(l-;U2)a2/W2
-dzLEi/w dzLEi/r dzLAn/ni dzLAiz/nz
d^KER/w — diEJER/v d^KARi/n\ d^KARs/nz
Its determinant is
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\g^^M2M±c'c'LK\H\
wm\n2
where
1^1 = |0| |A| - aid - Hi)^2 - a2(l - ;U2)di,
= El^ki'^ EK^Li> Q, i = 1,2.
The stability of the system requires that
1^1 >0 « \H\>0.
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